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Abstract 
 
This article considers the impact of the economic, social and political crisis on the 
labour law regimes of two of the Member States of the European Union most 
affected; Greece and Ireland. Both countries have been the recipients of ‘bail-out’ 
deals, negotiated and monitored by what has become known as the ‘Troika’ of the 
European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. The article considers the extent to which both countries have been required to 
make amendments to their labour law regimes, as a condition of their bail-outs. It 
argues that the changes demanded reflect the basic norm now governing the EU 
legal order, namely that of ‘competition’; the logic of market integration based on the 
primacy of economic competition.  
 
I. Introduction  
 
In 2004, the project of European Union integration was convulsed by the shock of 
referendum defeats in France and the Netherlands, when the proposed 
Constitutional Treaty was rejected. From today’s viewpoint, the periods of 
institutional and existential ‘crisis’ that followed that rejection, and the protracted and 
difficult negotiations that led to the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon,1  which came into 
force in December 2009, seem almost like halcyon days. The economic, social and 
political crisis that has erupted since 2008 has thrown the very survival of the 
European project into doubt.2  
This article considers specific impacts of the crisis in the context of two of the 
Member States in the eye of the storm. Greece and Ireland were the first two 
Eurozone Member States to require a funding package (commonly referred to as a 
‘bail-out’) from the ‘Troika’ of the European Commission, the European Central Bank 
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(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As part of the conditions for 
receiving funding, both countries agreed Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) 
with the Troika, under the terms of which each has pledged to undertake specified 
legal, economic and political reforms. It is the reforms required of each country’s 
collective labour law regimes with which this article is concerned. An analysis of 
these will demonstrate a clear norm underlying the approach of the Troika to 
regulation of the labour markets in the two States. We will argue that this norm is 
also evident in recent case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in relation to 
the vexed question of the balance between fundamental labour rights and worker 
protection, on the one hand, and the free movement of services and rights of 
establishment, on the other. We will argue that both recent decisions of the CJEU, 
and the labour market changes the Troika is insisting be made in Greece and 
Ireland, clearly demonstrate the existence of a hierarchical relationship in which 
fundamental labour rights are subordinated to fundamental economic freedoms. We 
will argue that the construction of this hierarchy has profound implications for the 
social dimension of the European integration project.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly outline how the crisis has played out 
in Greece and Ireland and sketch the background to the necessity of the Troika 
stepping in to bail-out the two countries. We then examine the labour market reform 
measures required by the Troika (focusing on those relating to collective autonomy, 
trade union rights, and arbitration and wage-setting mechanisms) before moving on 
to analyse the legislative reforms introduced or promised by both governments. We 
go on to critique the rationale underlying the reforms demanded, setting this in the 
context of what we see to be the basic norm governing the EU legal order as it has 
been established by the EU institutions and developed by the CJEU, namely that of 
‘competition’. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of these developments 
for the future of EU activity in the area of labour rights and the broader social policy 
field. 
 
II. The Crisis 
 
Much ink has already been spilled in describing and analysing the origins and 
development of what has become known, simply, as ‘the crisis’.3 We do not propose 
to cover this ground again here, but merely to briefly set the context for the signing of 
the MoUs in Greece and Ireland. This will involve a brief outline of the Greek and 
Irish industrial relations and labour law models and a description of how both 
countries came to the brink of economic collapse.  
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A. Greece 
 
Since the enactment of law 1876/1990, the Greek system of employment relations 
has become increasingly decentralised, involving a complex interaction between 
different sources of labour rights. A general framework of minimum obligatory 
working conditions is set out in legislation.4 However, after setting this general 
framework, the State is expected to retreat and respect the ‘collective autonomy’ of 
the social partners.5 Collective autonomy refers to the right of workers' and 
employers' representative bodies to negotiate collectively, and to define jointly, the 
terms and conditions of employment, as well as to resort to arbitration in the event 
that negotiations fail. A particular feature of Greek labour law is that collective 
autonomy is protected by Article 22(2) of the Greek Constitution, which prohibits 
State intervention both in the bargaining procedure, and in the content of collective 
agreements (CAs) and arbitration awards. The relationship between statutes and 
CAs is governed by the so-called ‘favourability principle’, according to which any 
terms contained in a CA which are more favourable to workers prevail over the terms 
set by legislation.6  
 
Pursuant to law 1876/1990, there are five types of collective agreements in Greece: 
(1) National multi-industry agreements, called National General Collective 
Agreements (NGCAs); (2) Industry-wide sectoral agreements; (3) Enterprise-level 
agreements; (4) Occupational agreements at national level; and (5) Occupational 
agreements at local level. The NGCAs are concluded annually or biennially between 
the Greek General Confederation of Labour (the main national trade union 
confederation), on the one hand, and the Federation of Greek Industries and 
General Confederation of Greek Small Businesses and Trades, on the other. 
Consequently, the social partners - and not the State - are responsible for fixing the 
obligatory minimum levels of pay and other working conditions that are applied 
throughout Greece. 
 
All collective agreements reached through collective bargaining are directly binding. 
The NGCAs and the enterprise-level CAs apply erga omnes, so that their normative 
terms become an integral part of any individual employment contract, which falls 
within their scope of application, while the sectoral and occupational-level CAs are 
binding only on the members of unions which have subscribed to these 
agreements.7 However, the terms of an individual employment contract can prevail 
over the terms of the relevant CA where the former are more favourable to the 
employee than the latter, according to the favourability principle.8 Until the recent 
                                               
4
 G. Lyon-Caen, J. Pélissier, and A. Supiot, Droit du Travail (Dalloz, 17e éd., 1994), 37. 
5
 A. Kazakos, Collective Labour Law (Sakkoulas, 2009) [in Greek], 54. The Supreme Administrative 
Court of Greece has also accepted this distribution of roles between the State and social partners; 
Council of State 632/1978, (1978) The Constitution, 178 [in Greek]. 
6
 N. Aliprantis, La Place de la Convention Collective de Travail dans la Hiérarchie des Normes (LGDJ, 
1980), 52-65. 
7
 I. Koukiadis, Labour Law: Collective Employment Relations (Sakkoulas, 2nd edn, 2011) [in Greek], 
293-298. 
8
 G. Lyon-Caen, J. Pélissier, and A. Supiot,  op cit n 4 supra, 49. 
 4 
changes discussed below, the favourability principle governed not only the 
relationship between individual employment contracts and CAs, but also the 
articulation of the different types of CAs.9 In line with this principle, a lower level CA 
(e.g. a local-level occupational agreement) could prevail over a higher level one (e.g. 
a sectoral agreement), where the former guaranteed more favourable terms to the 
employee than the latter.  
 
i. The Greek Crisis 
 
For the past three years, Greece has been lying at the epicentre of a global and 
European crisis,10 which started as a financial crisis, turned into a sovereign debt 
crisis followed by a crisis in the real economy,11 and now manifests itself as a deep 
social crisis with major impacts on the labour market. In May 2010, while the 
Eurozone failed to address the private debt crisis – which, along with the sovereign 
debt emergency, form the two components of the economic crisis – 12 the Greek 
government announced the country’s accession to an EU-IMF support mechanism in 
order to confront the high budget deficit and growing public debt. As a condition of 
receiving the EU-IMF loans, Greece was expected to implement not only severe 
fiscal cuts (an immediate 10% cut to government spending), but also extensive 
structural reforms. The terms of the First Memorandum of Understanding agreed 
with the Troika demanded a package of emergency measures, including pay cuts for 
all public servants and restrictions on pension rights, and resulted in lay-offs in both 
the public and private sectors. Unsurprisingly, in the eyes of many commentators, 
these austerity measures, instead of reducing the high deficit, served only to 
constrain economic activity even further, with the country’s economy sinking into a 
deeper recession.13  
 
Nevertheless, the Greek government announced at the end of 2010 new, tougher 
austerity measures, new taxes, and a higher rate of VAT. Once again, the imposed 
measures accompanied only a worsening of the country’s debt. By the summer of 
2011, it became clear that debt restructuring was unavoidable.14 After the Greek 
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Private Sector Involvement (PSI) was announced in July 2011, and without any 
national elections being held, a new coalition government came to power with the 
support of Greece's two largest political parties  (PASOK and New Democracy) and 
the participation of the far-right party, LAOS. The new government committed to 
carrying out the terms of the new bail-out-PSI combination package. However, the 
deep ‘haircut’ carried out in October 2011 was accompanied by a new loan and a 
new agreement on another austerity plan. The new package of austerity measures 
signed between the Greek government and Troika in February 2012, widely known 
as the ‘Second  Memorandum’, found Greece’s workforce bearing the cost of the 
‘voluntary default’, Greece facing a shrinking economy and a still unsustainable debt, 
and Europe facing the extension of the crisis into an indefinite future. At the time of 
writing, Greece is preparing for new elections to be held in June 2012, since the 
efforts to form a new coalition government following the general election held on 6 
May have failed, thus prolonging the country’s political crisis. 
 
B. Ireland 
 
The Irish tale is similarly cautionary. The Irish system of employment relations has 
traditionally been classified as ‘voluntarist’, where the role of the State is primarily to 
provide a supportive framework for collective bargaining (rather than to regulate the 
labour market by way of legislation).15 Whilst, in the last two decades, a number of 
developments, notably the decline in trade union density and workplace presence 
since the 1980s and the obligations of EU membership, has resulted in a large 
volume of labour legislation being passed, the vast majority of legislative measures 
provides for rights in respect of individual workers.16 In terms of collective labour law, 
voluntarism, in the Irish context, refers to a situation whereby employees have a 
constitutional right to form trade unions, but employers are under no obligation to 
bargain with such unions.17 There is, furthermore, no statutory recognition scheme 
under which employers can, in certain circumstances, be mandated to recognise 
trade unions for bargaining purposes. 
  
Where collective bargaining does take place, collective agreements reached have 
generally been regarded under Irish law as not being capable of legal enforcement.18 
Moreover, concluded collective agreements do not produce erga omnes effects. 
Certain limited exceptions to this general rule exist, such as where collective 
agreements are registered with the Labour Court (known as Registered Employment 
Agreements; REAs).19 Collective agreements made by Joint Industrial Councils 
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(JICs) are also registered with the Labour Court and are legally binding.20 JICs are 
voluntary negotiating bodies for an industry or part of an industry, designed to 
facilitate collective bargaining at industry level; they generally exist in sectors with 
relatively high levels of unionisation (e.g. the construction sector). In practice, 
sectoral REAs are made between the main employer body representing employers 
in the sector and the trade unions representing workers in the industry. In addition, 
Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) provide for the fixing of minimum rates of pay and 
the regulation of employment in certain sectors where there is little or no collective 
bargaining and where significant numbers of vulnerable workers are employed (e.g. 
retail, catering and hotels).21 JLCs, which comprise of an independent chairperson, 
appointed by the Minister, and representative members of workers and employers, 
propose Employment Regulation Orders (EROs), which, when confirmed by the 
Labour Court, set legally binding minimum wages and conditions of employment for 
workers in the sectors covered. Prior to 2011, EROs provided: for minimum sectoral 
rates of pay in excess of the national minimum wage; for sectoral pay scales, based 
on length of service and skill level; for sectoral overtime payments and premium 
payments to those required to work on Sundays; and for benefits for employees in 
the relevant sectors that were not imparted by general labour legislation (most 
notably, a right to sick pay).  
 
From 1987-2009, a series of tripartite social pacts was concluded between the social 
partners (the State, unions, employers and some other representative interest 
groups), focusing on issues of pay (particularly in the public sector), tax reform and a 
range of other socio-economic issues.22 Again, the bargaining and implementation 
processes under the ‘social partnership’ process were voluntary, with unilateral 
withdrawal by any party possible at any time. A number of measures were agreed, 
which were then progressed through the normal legislative process; for example, 
legislation on the national minimum wage.23 The Irish social partnership model 
attracted a wave of attention from academics and policy-makers all over the world,24 
which focused on how Ireland, with its historically antagonistic, fragmented Anglo-
Saxon industrial relations system, was capable of maintaining such a distinctive, 
corporatist-style system of socio-economic governance. Furthermore, the social 
partnership era coincided with the ‘Celtic Tiger’ period of astonishing growth in 
wealth creation and employment.25 
 
i. The Irish Crisis 
 
The crisis that has gripped most of the Western world has, however, brought the 
Irish social partnership juggernaut crashing to a halt and Ireland is presently in the 
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grip of a deep economic recession.26 From 2008, the country has experienced a 
rapid deterioration in the public finances, a collapse in the housing market and 
construction sector, and a liquidity crisis for the banking system.27 The recent 
‘bursting’ of national financial and housing bubbles, coupled with the government's 
2008 decision (endorsed by the EU) to State guarantee all banking debt, has meant 
that the crisis in Ireland is particularly severe. In March 2009, the government 
unilaterally introduced an emergency budget, introducing pay cuts for all public 
servants. In December 2009, attempts to negotiate a new social pact collapsed and 
that month’s budget again cut public sector pay. In March 2010, with the social 
partnership process moribund, the public sector unions and employers concluded a 
new four-year Public Service Agreement (the ‘Croke Park Agreement’),28 under 
which it was agreed to protect public sector pay levels in exchange for a reduction in 
employee numbers and a substantial commitment to organisational reform. In 
November 2010, the Irish government accepted the terms of an IMF-EU rescue 
package, outlined a four-year austerity plan, and, in the December budget, 
introduced €6 billion of tax increases, new charges and levies and severe welfare 
and public spending cuts (including a cut in the minimum wage). A general election 
in early-2011 brought a new coalition government to power, which has committed to 
carrying out the terms of the bail-out package. The 2011 budget introduced a range 
of further austerity measures (including further levies and charges and further cuts to 
public spending).  
 
C. The Memorandums of Understanding and Labour Law Reform 
 
As noted above, the Greek government agreed, as a precondition for receiving bail-
out funds, to the adoption of an austerity program, the exact terms of which were 
provided for in the First MoU signed between the Greek government and Troika in 
May 2010 and the Second MoU concluded in February 2012.29 Both MoUs contain a 
complex set of internal policy provisions relating to fiscal consolidation that focus on 
both the public and private sectors. The MoUs also, however, address ‘structural 
reforms’, many of which are aimed at a restructuring of the labour market. The MoUs 
are premised on the belief that the chronic ‘competitiveness deficit’ of the Greek 
economy can be dealt with through ‘internal devaluation’; through a reduction in 
labour costs to be achieved, not only by wage cuts, but also by imposing general 
restrictions on labour rights. In order to achieve the required internal devaluation, 
particularly in the context of the (still) relatively heavily regulated nature of the Greek 
industrial relations system, the MoUs prescribe a number of legislative reforms in a 
strikingly detailed manner. In fact, the reform provisions (especially those relating to 
the labour market) are so detailed that the framework laws implementing them into 
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the national legal order translate them more-or-less automatically into domestic 
statutory provisions. So, Article 1 para. 6 of framework law 4046/2012, implementing 
the Second Memorandum, provides that the MoU clauses relating to labour market 
reform constitute directly applicable rules. Both Memorandums, therefore, have 
resulted in far-reaching legislative reforms in the labour market, which, as it will be 
argued below, are neither occasional nor partial.  
 
The Irish MoU, dated December 1 2010,30 unsurprisingly focuses on measures 
relating to fiscal consolidation and financial sector reforms. However, the MoU 
similarly addresses ‘structural reforms’ relating to the labour market. The 2010 
agreement pledged a reduction in the national minimum wage of approximately 
11.5%, which was implemented by the government in that year’s budget, but was 
reversed by the new government, following negotiations with the Troika in May 
2011.31 The most significant pledge, however, for the purposes of this article, was to 
commission an independent review of the Registered Employment Agreement (REA) 
and Joint Labour Committee (JLC) arrangements, with terms of reference and follow-
up actions to be agreed with the Commission. This review was to be carried out in 
order to ensure there were no distortions of wage conditions across sectors 
associated with the presence of sectoral minimum wages in addition to the national 
minimum wage. It is noteworthy that, by contrast with the Greek case, little in terms 
of legislative reform was demanded by the Irish MoU. The explanation for this, 
undoubtedly, reflects heavily the comparatively light nature of Irish labour law 
regulation. As noted, where legislation exists, it focuses almost exclusively on 
providing a floor of minimum rights for individual workers. Statutory provisions 
supporting collective bargaining are almost non-existent. Thus, bargained standards 
that exceed statutory minima (in terms of pay, working time, etc) are either achieved 
by trade unions through the deployment (or threat) of industrial action, in the public 
sector by virtue of the (legally non-binding) Croke Park Agreement, or in sectors 
covered by EROs or REAs; the last mentioned being the one area where the Troika 
did demand government action.  
 
III. The Legislative Response 
 
A. Greece 
 
Since the beginning of 2010, significant changes have been made to worker 
protection laws in Greece. The laws that have been enacted, implementing the 
provisions of the MoUs, are based on the assumption that, as existing labour 
legislation constituted the principal obstacle to the competitiveness of the Greek 
economy, the basic protective labour regulation architecture should be dismantled. In 
                                               
30
 The 2010 MoU and all subsequent documents relating to Ireland’s bail-out are available at 
http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=6856 (accessed 21 May 2012).  
31
 ibid, MoU May 2011.  
 9 
particular, the underlying logic of the relevant statutes is that labour costs, especially 
wage costs, constitute the determining factor of an economy’s competitiveness.32 
Consequently, the measures taken to depress not only wages, but labour standards 
as a whole, should lead to enhanced Greek competitiveness.33 Thus, in line with the 
‘internal devaluation’ logic, the recently adopted legal provisions regarding ‘labour 
market regulation’ aim to dismantle core elements of the Greek industrial relations 
system, which were intended primarily for the protection of workers.34 
 
i. Minimum Wages and Wage Setting Mechanisms 
 
As noted, the NGCA concluded periodically between the union and employer 
representative bodies determines the obligatory minimum levels of pay, and 
minimum terms of employment, applied throughout Greece. Despite the crisis, in 
2010, the social partners were able to conclude a new NGCA which set the 
obligatory minimum wages to be applied until the end of 2012. However, the 
implementation of the terms of the Second MoU completely set aside both the 
preceding national social dialogue and the binding agreement of the social partners. 
The Second MoU requires, first, that the minimum wages established by the NGCA 
are to be reduced by 22% compared to the level of 1 January 2012, while for young 
workers (those aged below 25), the wages established by the NGCA are to be 
reduced by 32%. Secondly, clauses in the law and/or in collective agreements that 
provide for automatic wage increases, including those based on seniority, are to be 
suspended until the unemployment rate falls below 10%.35 Thirdly, by the end of July 
2012, a timetable for an overhaul of the NGCA will be prepared which shall aim at 
replacing the wage rates set in the NGCA with a statutory minimum wage set by the 
government, in consultation with social partners.36 
 
In addition to their obvious harshness, the above measures clearly infringe collective 
autonomy since they intervene in, and alter to the detriment of the worker, the 
outcomes of national social dialogue, as well as the content of concluded CAs. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that the legislative responses to the demands of the MoUs 
aim at restricting the scope of collective bargaining, by replacing collectively agreed 
working standards with binding minima set by law. 
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ii. The Abolition of the ‘Favourability Principle’ 
  
The legislative reform that most severely infringes upon collective autonomy has 
been the abolition of the favourability principle, formerly a fundamental organising 
principle of the Greek labour law system. Article 37 para. 5 of law 4024/2011, 
implementing the First MoU, provides that enterprise-level CAs will prevail (in all 
cases) over sectoral CAs, even where the clauses contained in the former are less 
favourable to the employee than those contained in the latter. Furthermore, Article 
37 para. 1 of the same law provides that any group of workers representing three-
fifths (60%) of those employed in the enterprise may conclude enterprise level CAs, 
a power traditionally reserved only to legally formed trade unions. In other words, the 
law allows groups of workers which possess neither negotiating nor ‘formal’ 
representative power to conclude enterprise level CAs, which can derogate from 
those at sectoral level. 
  
The clear goal of these reforms is to promote and reinforce enterprise-level CAs, 
whilst marginalising sectoral CAs. This is likely to have a major impact on the 
regulation of industrial relations to the detriment of workers, given that, in almost all 
European systems of collective autonomy, collective bargaining and collective 
agreements at sectoral level play a dominant role.37 In particular, sectoral CAs have 
proven to be the most appropriate and effective mechanism in terms of laying down 
conditions of employment, especially wage rates, primarily because they are able to 
homogenise to a large extent wages (and, indeed, other working standards), thus 
taking them out of competition.38 At the same time, sectoral-level bargaining 
significantly reduces the danger of trade unions being manipulated by, or 
subordinated to, the employer, a danger which is more clearly present at enterprise-
level. Nonetheless, sectoral CAs are to be marginalised in Greece under the new 
legal regime, the aim of which seems to be the imprisonment of collective bargaining 
structures within the limits of the enterprise, where labour is weaker numerically and 
in terms of negotiating power.  
 
iii. Changes in the Arbitral Regime 
 
In accordance with the terms of the Second MoU, arbitration shall now take place 
only when agreed by both employee and employer groups. Under the previous legal 
regime (Article 16 of law 1876/1990), trade unions had the right to unilaterally resort 
to arbitration, in cases where they accepted, but the employer rejected, a mediator’s 
proposition. Moreover, henceforth resort to arbitration may only take place in respect 
of issues regarding the basic wage (and not in relation to other forms of 
remuneration or working conditions). Again, under the previous regime, the 
                                               
37
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arbitration process could be concerned with any issue which formed part of the 
subject-matter of collective bargaining. Finally, Article 51 of law 3871/2010, 
implementing the provisions of the First MoU, provides that arbitration awards are 
not allowed to grant, in any way, wage increases for the year 2012 (this has been the 
case, in practice, since 2010). In general, the demands of the MoUs regarding 
arbitration aim at restricting its role, thus setting aside a major component of the 
collective bargaining mechanism outlined in the Greek Constitution (Article 22(2)).39 
It is, thus, once again apparent that the terms of the MoUs seek to limit the influence 
of the social partners - and especially that of the trade unions - on labour market 
regulation.  
 
The Second MoU also requires that ‘collective agreements which have expired will 
remain in force for a maximum period of three months’ and that ‘if a new agreement 
is not reached, after this period remuneration will revert to the basic wage’.40 The 
implications of this provision must be assessed jointly with the changes in the arbitral 
regime described above. When a CA expires (including the NGCA) the social 
partners must reach a new agreement within three months.41 During this period, it 
will clearly be in the employers’ interests not to reach agreement given that, in the 
event that the negotiations fail, the wages of the employees concerned will revert to 
the basic wage. As the workers cannot now resort to arbitration without the 
employer’s consent, and such consent will be, of course, unlikely to be forthcoming 
within the three-month period, the most likely outcome of such a scenario is that the 
majority of workers will relatively quickly see their pay drop to the level of the basic 
wage.  
 
Allied to all this is clear evidence that the labour law policies currently being applied 
seem to be promoting a transition from collective to individual bargaining. Since the 
beginning of 2011, more and more Greek enterprises have concluded individual 
contracts of employment,42 which provide for lower wages and inferior conditions of 
employment than those contained in the previously applicable CAs. Needless to say, 
individual bargaining, in the context of an economic recession, equates to a severe 
infringement on the right to negotiate, since in most such cases the terms of 
employment are simply imposed by the employer. It should be remembered, too, that 
the sharp wage decline has been accompanied by rising unemployment, a drop in 
social security contributions and a consequent deterioration in the financial status of 
the Greek social insurance system.   
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B. Ireland 
 
In Ireland, as noted, much less has been demanded in terms of reforming labour 
market regulation. The review of the ERO and REA systems was published in May 
2010 and recommended reform, rather than abolition.43 Before the government took 
any action, events were somewhat overtaken when the Irish High Court declared 
that the legislation allowing the imposition of terms and conditions of employment by 
means of an ERO was unconstitutional.44 The decision, predictably, was welcomed 
by employer groups, with many calling for the abolition of the ERO system in its 
entirety.45 Trade unions, meanwhile, expressed concerns that, following the ruling, 
workers in sectors covered by EROs, would have their terms and conditions of 
employment downgraded.46 However, the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and 
Innovation has moved swiftly to pledge new legislation to re-establish, with 
significant reforms, the ERO/REA systems; the result is the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) (No 3) Bill 2011.  
 
It is noticeable that the proposed legislation does not take up the recommendation of 
the ERO/REA review group, set up in accordance with the MoU, to establish a well-
designed framework where collective bargaining (within the meaning of Article 28 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and relevant International 
Labour Organisation – ILO – Conventions)47 could take place. However, it should be 
acknowledged that the Irish government, with the consent of the Troika, has chosen 
to re-establish the ERO/REA systems, rather than simply abolish them. Nonetheless, 
the discernible regulatory trend that can be identified in this case is one that seeks a 
move away, first, from prioritising the role of the social partners in negotiating and 
policing regulation of terms and conditions of employment and, secondly, moving 
towards the establishment of statutory minimum standards and away from bargained 
terms and conditions of employment.  
 
First, in a number of crucial ways, the Bill either explicitly or implicitly sanctions an 
imposition of statutory minimum standards. It explicitly prohibits, for example, EROs 
from providing for premium pay rates for Sunday working, as was the case 
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previously.48 The Bill lists a number of factors to be considered by JLCs when 
formulating an ERO (e.g. consideration of the appropriateness of fixing a minimum 
hourly rate of pay that is higher than the existing statutory minimum wage; the wage 
levels in comparable sectors in other countries) and also sets restrictions on 
establishing pay scales that seek to go beyond the basic rate in order to reflect skills 
and experience.49 As a result, in an echo of the Greek case, what emerges in terms 
of remuneration under the reconstituted ERO system may well approximate the 
provisions of the minimum wage legislation.  
 
The Bill also contains ‘inability to pay’ provisions, allowing employers to seek 
temporary derogations from the sector-level minimum pay and conditions set by 
EROs on grounds of financial difficulty.50 These individual exemptions, which can be 
granted to employers for up to two years and, in some cases, without the agreement 
of employees, may well undermine the ERO/REA systems entirely, by creating an 
uneven playing field and allowing employers with exemptions to undercut their 
competitors. The legislation also confers a wide discretion on the Minister to accept 
or reject a proposed ERO or REA. It has been argued that the legislation, in this 
respect, lacks proportionality by giving the Minister an outright veto, rather than an 
oversight role.51 Finally, given the weak constitutional and statutory protection 
afforded trade unions under Irish law, it is not at all clear that employers that refuse 
to recognise trade unions for bargaining purposes will simply accept the imposition of 
terms and conditions of employment (under EROs) negotiated by committees on 
which trade unions are represented. It is also likely that increasing challenges to the  
‘representativeness’ of the parties to an REA may occur, from employers who are 
openly hostile to trade union involvement in standard-setting processes.52  
 
IV. Social Policy, Labour Rights and the ‘Competition’ 
Principle 
 
Our analysis of the provisions of the Greek and Irish MoUs, as they affect the 
respective labour law regimes, clearly shows that the demands of the Troika (which 
includes, of course, the European Commission) are directed towards reducing the 
influence of trade unions on labour market regulation and reducing the scope for 
collectively bargained employment standards, in favour of legally binding minima. 
The role of the social partners (and, especially, the trade unions) in enforcing and 
policing employment standards is also reduced. 
 
At first glance, such demands seem to run counter to recent developments in 
European law. Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
which guarantees the right to form and join trade unions, has lately been the subject 
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of a number of significant applications before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). In Demir and Baykara v Turkey53 the ECtHR held that Article 11 
encompasses a right not to have prohibitions imposed on the freedom of trade 
unions to engage in collective bargaining. The Court seemed to suggest that the 
absence of legislation necessary to give effect to provisions of international law (in 
particular ILO Conventions) protecting collective bargaining rights might be in breach 
of the ECHR.54 Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, Article 
6(3) of the new Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that ‘fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the (ECHR) and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's 
law’.55 Moreover, the Treaty of Lisbon confirmed the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
as having the same legal value as the EU Treaties.56  Article 28 of the Charter 
provides for the right of trade unions to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend 
their interests, including strike action. Furthermore, Article 152 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU (TFEU) states that the Union ‘recognises and promotes the 
role of the social partners’ at Union level, whilst the Treaty grants the social partners 
at both Union and Member State level unique and privileged roles in the legislative 
process, underlining the importance that the Union gives to collective autonomy as a 
core self-regulating mechanism of industrial relations.57 The Union’s commitment in 
the Treaties to protecting collective labour rights and promoting the rights of the 
social partners can be placed in the broader context of the affirmation and 
reinforcement in the Treaties of the Union’s social dimension. Article 3(3) TEU, for 
example, states that the Union shall work to establish a ‘social market economy, 
aiming at full employment and social progress’ and it shall also ‘promote social 
justice’.  
 
In this regard, the MoUs and the (proposed/) statutes implementing their provisions, 
appear to conflict with the goals outlined in the Treaties and more generally to clash 
with the basic principles of the European social model.58 However, we argue that this 
apparent contrast is, in fact, illusory and that the logic of the reforms demanded is 
fully in conformity with the norm that governs the EU legal order. Moreover, we argue 
that the deregulatory thrust of the Greek and Irish reforms are perfectly consistent 
with the organising principle of the EU as it has been established by the EU 
institutions and developed mainly by the CJEU; this principle being ‘competition’. 
This main principle thus defines the rules of EU governance of industrial relations, 
rules by which the MoUs seek to have the Greek and Irish labour law regimes abide.  
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A. The Memorandums of Understanding and the ‘Grundnorm’ of the 
EU Legal Order 
 
Perhaps the most common misunderstanding of European integration is that the 
process of establishing a single market is realised through the minimisation, or even 
the prohibition, of State intervention, on the basis that the free market will regulate 
itself fairly.59 On the contrary, the integrated market is principally promoted by a 
particular form of governance, and the process of integration is basically 
characterised by recourse to regulatory institutions, which exist to dictate certain 
policies, in order to achieve certain goals.60 A mode of governance is thus 
established, if not imposed, which facilitates and enhances competition, 
guaranteeing in this way the ‘free’ function of the market. This mode of governance, 
which is regulatory and, consequently, deeply interventionist, is instituted either 
through direct EU legislation or through the decisions of the CJEU. The Court, it is 
uncontroversial to note, has gradually broadened the scope of the free movement 
provisions, granting them the status of fundamental rights, in order to establish the 
EU legal order and to extend EU supervision over national legal orders. This 
expansive interpretation has led to a spill-over of market integration rules into almost 
all areas of national law and, consequently, many national social rights and policies 
have been challenged as being contrary to free movement provisions and, as a 
result, have been revised or even rejected.61  
 
This march of events cannot be considered to be random. In order for a market 
rationale to be established, competition shall no longer refer only to the economic 
field, but shall also enter into the legislative sphere, becoming the latter’s organising 
principle.62 In other words, ‘“competition” becomes the main principle of policy-
making, setting in motion a regulatory mechanism that would reject any policy that 
might harm competition and would only allow through its filter policy proposals’ that 
conform with its logic.63 Through this mechanism of rejection or approval of policies, 
of potential rules, ‘competition’ itself is rendered a general norm. In other words, any 
regulatory policy choice is assessed in terms of its ability to favour this specific 
model of market governance. ‘Competition’ appears to function as the ‘Grundnorm’,64 
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for it constitutes the precondition for validity of all derived rules, a meta-legal norm 
that has not been produced by a constituent power and upon which the entire legal 
system is based. Legislative reforms are thus dictated by the basic norm of 
competition and the relevant rules are envisaged and applied in order to organise, to 
facilitate and to stimulate competition itself, and it is exactly this idea that rules are 
necessary for the proper functioning of competition that lies at the heart of this new 
model of governance.65 
 
The basic norm of competition governs the judicial sphere also. By ‘govern’ we do 
not simply refer here to the influence of a dominant ideology on judicial 
interpretation, but to the perception of competition as the ‘Grundnorm’ upon which 
the whole regulatory system is founded.66 In this framework, any potential multiplicity 
(or conflict) of values is not taken into consideration67 and the balancing of conflicting 
rights is replaced by the application of one vigorous rule, that which best serves the 
functioning of the ‘competition norm’.68 This has been exactly the structure of the 
CJEU rulings in the ‘Laval Quartet’ series of case law.  In these widely known cases, 
the CJEU was called upon to deliver its judgment with regard to disputes that arose 
from the collision of an economic freedom with a trade union right. Instead of framing 
the issue as involving the confrontation of two opposed rights of equal value,69 the 
Court organised its reasoning on the basis of the application of a legal rule. Thus, the 
premise which prevailed in the Court’s judgment was the binary logic of ‘rule – 
exception’,70 where the economic freedom was considered to be ‘the rule’, whilst the 
collective labour right was identified as ‘the exception’. An ideological hierarchy of 
values (where economic freedoms lie over and above social rights) was thus 
transformed, through the Court’s reasoning, into a prescriptive supremacy.71  
 
As a result, on the basis of the application of the basic norm, legislative initiatives are 
accepted to the extent that they enhance market competition; either by imposing 
rules which promote, or by dismantling regulatory systems which hinder, such 
competition. Market economy rules are considered to be a stable and unchangeable 
element, a standard to which national legal orders should adjust, with the only 
question left to the political authorities being how to manage the reforms necessary 
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to adjust to these ‘objective’ standards in national legal systems. 72 It is precisely, 
then, this process of ‘necessary adjustment’ to the rules set out by the ‘competition 
norm’, which leads national legislatures to compete against each other. 
Consequently, even ‘national legislative models are today treated as so many 
products in competition with each other in the world market of norms’.73 This is best 
exemplified in the field of industrial relations, where national labour law systems 
compete against each in terms of their impact on economic competitiveness. It is 
from this competition of laws that the danger of a ‘race to the bottom’ in respect of 
terms and conditions of employment emerges.  
 
Thus, Ireland, with its lightly regulated labour market74 and meagre protection for 
collective bargaining, is required only to ‘review’ but one aspect of its labour 
legislation; although, notably, one of the few aspects that provides for bargained 
standards, which impede the free workings of market competition.75 Even here, 
however, in April 2012, the Troika insisted on two amendments to the proposed Irish 
legislation; first, to allow employers seeking temporary ‘inability to pay’ exemptions to 
get two consecutive exemptions within the overall two-year limit, where necessary to 
safeguard employment and, secondly, to ensure the process for granting a variation 
or cancellation of a REA is conducted in a timely manner.76 Both amendments, whilst 
relatively minor in and of themselves, represent support for a minimalist position in 
terms of the extent to which future EROs/REAs might offer bargained terms and 
conditions of employment in excess of statutory minima. However, what is perhaps 
more significant is the extent to which labour market regulation is to be ‘micro-
managed’ by the EU institutions; even in relatively ‘neo-liberal’ Ireland,77 the 
implementation of the dominant norm of ‘competition’ must be closely monitored.  
 
Unsurprisingly, then, Greece must go considerably further and dismantle a range of 
protections for trade union rights. Under Greece’s new labour law regime, collective 
autonomy and social dialogue are imprisoned within a legislative framework, which is 
to be directly supervised by the courts.78 The law directly restricts collective 
autonomy79 and the role of arbitration, for the law is the mechanism responsible for 
guaranteeing the respect of the ‘competition norm’. The regulation of labour relations 
is to be organised on the basis of the maxim that not only wages, but also general 
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terms and conditions of employment, should be reduced in order to become 
competitive within the integrated market. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
We have argued that the reforms demanded of Greek and Irish labour law by the 
Troika, in exchange for financial backing, have been aimed squarely at reducing the 
scope for collectively bargained labour standards and social partner monitoring 
thereof, and concentrate on ensuring only the enforcement of legally binding 
minimum standards of pay, and other terms and conditions of employment. We have 
also argued that this is perfectly consistent with the underlying norm dominating EU 
governance processes, particularly in the sphere of labour market regulation, and 
most recently visible in the ‘Laval Quartet’ judgments of the CJEU.80  
 
The issues discussed in this article are, of course, hugely significant for workers, 
employers and other labour market actors.81However, they also touch on 
fundamental questions about the future direction of economy and society at both 
domestic and EU level. First, bargained standard-setting is of particular pertinence to 
low-paid sectors where vulnerable workers tend to be concentrated. Such sectors 
are often characterised by low levels of trade union organisation, and relatively high 
numbers of migrant workers, young people, and part-time and casual workers, with 
little or no individual bargaining power, and who are, consequently, more amenable 
to succumbing to pressure to accept inferior working terms and conditions.82 As 
Duffy and Walsh note, for ‘unskilled workers in a large European labour market with 
free mobility of labour it is unlikely that the market mechanism will 
provide…adequate protection’.83 In such a labour market, the danger of competition 
in terms of continually degrading working conditions is ever present, since 
enterprises established in States with different level of workers’ protection can 
operate in the same integrated market. Removal of trade union and collective 
bargaining protections would be likely to have seriously detrimental social 
consequences for many already low-paid workers, and would disproportionately 
affect certain categories of workers, such as migrants and females.  
 
Secondly, it has been noted that the jurisprudence on collectively bargained 
standards ‘has the potential to alienate from the single market and the EU a segment 
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of public opinion, workers' movements and trade unions, which has been over time a 
key supporter of economic integration’.84 It is contended here that it is not simply 
workers’ movements that are disconcerted by a potential ‘race to the bottom’ in 
terms of working terms and conditions, and social protection, but that the current 
economic climate has engendered a much more widespread public suspicion of 
greater market integration measures at EU level, which for many, is ‘code for 
dismantling social rights protected at national level’.85 In the initial common market 
project (as outlined in the Treaty of Rome) it was a widespread belief that the internal 
market would automatically lead to social progress and to the harmonisation of 
national social legislation.86 However, the policy of the Union’s non-intervention in 
the social field has evidently been traced out.87 In Greece and Ireland, the role 
played by EU institutions (especially the Commission) in the context of the economic 
crisis and, in particular, the terms of the economic support packages have clearly 
damaged public support for the EU project.88  
 
Finally, we return to the issue of labour rights. It seems apparent from the analysis in 
this article that the protection and promotion of collective labour rights in the EU legal 
order cannot be achieved through the mere recitation of social rights in a catalogue 
of fundamental rights,89 even if this catalogue is to be legally binding. What it 
demands is a political restructuring of EU policies and institutions, for, without an 
expansion of the EU's competences within the social field, any social objective will 
remain simply declaratory.90 EU social policy should no longer be conceived as a 
functional necessity of economic integration, but as an autonomous competence 
based on criteria of distributive justice.91 Consequently, it is maintained that EU 
competences in the social policy field need to evolve from the ‘regulatory status’, 
where they have been until now, to the ‘redistributive status’; for without a substantial 
budget focusing on redistribution, the EU’s social dimension will not be sufficiently 
prompted.92 Such a transition could only be achieved through the reintroduction of 
control (both political and legal) over competition with a view to enhancing the well-
being of society; if serving society’s interest is still considered to be a valued end in 
itself. 
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